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Abstract The United States Department of Health and Human Services emphasizes a holistic 
approach to early childhood education and family development in its Head Start programming 
for low-income families. Head Start, since its inception, has been the subject of rigorous 
evaluation and analysis. Nearly all of the analysis, however, has focused on children’s cognitive 
and social development. In this paper, I assess the role Head Start plays in parents’ labor-force 
decisions. Using data from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS), a randomized longitudinal study 
of first-time Head Start applicants, I develop and estimate a model for the labor-force 
participation of low-income mothers with access to Head Start. I observe increased labor-force 
participation rates among HSIS mothers randomly assigned access to Head Start for both 
cohorts, which dissipate when the child reaches kindergarten age. The positive labor-force 
outcomes were most pronounced among subgroups of mothers with the greatest relative 
economic disadvantage before Head Start, while the most well-off subgroups decreased their 
labor force participation after receiving access to Head Start. 
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Introduction 
     The Office of Economic Opportunity’s Community Action Program initiated the Head 
Start Program in 1965 as a part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty. The program 
began as an intervention to reduce disparities in children’s K-12 educational outcomes. Prior to 
the creation of Head Start, early childhood education programs were largely inaccessible to low-
income families. As a result, low-income students entered public schools at an immediate 
educational disadvantage to more affluent students— many of whom had been in pre-school for 
several years. Today, Head Start is operated by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services and emphasizes health and wellness, educational and social development, and a 
family environment conducive to child development. Appropriations for Head Start, in real 
dollars, have grown nearly 1,600% since the program was initiated. Enrollment in Head Start 
programs, meanwhile, has grown to more than 950,000 students (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services 2014).  
The effects of Head Start have been the subject of passionate debate since its creation. 
Critics of Head Start cite the fading of Head Start’s academic effects as evidence of the 
program’s ineffectiveness. Supporters present evidence of long-term economic and social 
benefits experienced by Head Start participants. The debate surrounding the merits of Head Start 
reached a climax during the 2013 sequester debate, when a $407 million (5.6%) cut to Head 
Start’s funding caused a 6% reduction in enrollment capacity. 
The short- and long-term effects of Head Start on students’ academic, social, and 
economic development have been extensively studied. Understudied are the effects of Head Start 
on participating parents. Head Start functions much like a childcare subsidy; parents who enroll 
their children in Head Start do not need to pay for center-based childcare or watch their children 
while their children are in Head Start. The theoretical effect of such an opportunity is ambiguous. 
Parents who would otherwise spend their time watching their children may choose to enter the 
labor force, while parents who no longer need to pay for child care may choose to work less 
when they have access to Head Start. Without empirical evidence, it is difficult to fully account 
for the effects of Head Start on parents who also benefit from the program. 
This paper analyzes the effects of Head Start on the labor-force outcomes of mothers with 
participating children. I use annual survey data collected through the Head Start Impact Study 
(HSIS) between 2002-06 to conduct my analysis, taking advantage of its randomization to 
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estimate the causal effects of Head Start on participant outcomes. I observe modest 
improvements in labor-force outcomes for mothers randomized into access in both cohorts of the 
HSIS sample. For mothers of the cohort of three-year-old first-time Head Start applicants, I find 
that access to Head Start increases the likelihood of full-time employment by 4.81% during the 
first year of Head Start. Mothers of four-year-old first-time applicants were 6.46% more likely to 
participate in the labor force in the year their children had access to Head Start. The effects were 
heterogeneous and offsetting across subgroups. The least advantaged subgroups in the pre-HSIS 
survey experienced the greatest positive long-term labor effects from access to Head Start, while 
the most advantaged subgroups experienced negative long-term labor effects. These results 
confirm many of the canonical labor-leisure model as applied to Head Start. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a simple labor-supply 
framework for predicting responsiveness to Head Start. Section II surveys the existing empirical 
literature related to Head Start and the economics of childcare subsidies. Section III describes 
HSIS, the data used in the study. Section IV outlines my empirical strategy of analysis. Section 
V presents results, which I discuss in Section VI, and Section VII concludes. 
I. Theoretical Model 
The impact of Head Start can be understood within the canonical labor-leisure model, 
modified to incorporate childcare costs. Assume that a mother seeks to maximize wellbeing  
U(C, L) through her allocation of leisure time (L) and consumption of market goods (C).1 Each 
hour a mother works, she must pay for childcare, as captured in the budget constraint 
(1)                                               𝐶 ≤ (𝑤 − 𝑝)ℎ + (𝐹 + 𝑉), 
where the price of childcare (p) acts as a tax on a mother’s hourly wage (w) in each hour (h) a 
mother works. Therefore, her consumption is constrained by the sum of her income, net 
childcare costs, paternal contributions to household income (F), and nonwage income (V). In the 
model, a mother first chooses to participate in the labor force and, contingent on labor-force 
participation, chooses the degree to which she works through hours worked (h).  A mother’s 
take-home hourly wage (w – p) decreases with the price of childcare.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Blau (2003) for a more extensive treatment of the model. For simplicity, the model assumes that the only 
childcare options are paid care and maternal care. The model also assumes that only one child requires care. I relax 
this assumption in my empirical analysis. The model assumes no fixed cost of labor and ignores any utility derived 
from the educational and socially developmental benefits borne onto Head Start participants. 
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A change in a mother’s take home wage has two effects on her degree of labor-force 
participation: a substitution effect and an income effect. Consider the effects of a shock that 
decreases childcare costs to p’ such that (w – p’) > (w – p). An increase in the mother’s wage 
allows her to consume at the same level working fewer hours; this income effect increases her 
consumption of leisure. However, the opportunity cost of leisure increases to the higher wage; 
this substitution effect pushes her to increase her hours worked. The dominance of one effect 
over the other depends on three factors: a mother’s preferences, pre-Head Start labor force 
participation, and other nonwage income.  
For mothers not in the labor force, a change in the take home wage can have only a 
substitution effect. Mothers out of the labor force cannot increase their leisure allocation; thus, 
there is no income effect for mothers not participating in the labor force. Mothers with 
significant aversions to work will remain unemployed, while some mothers will opt to enter the 
labor force when faced with a higher effective wage. Therefore, an increase in the effective wage 
resulting from access to Head Start will have an unambiguous nonnegative effect on labor-force 
participation. For mothers already working, however, the net result of the income and 
substitution effects is theoretically ambiguous. 
 Figure 1A demonstrates this analysis, which I also describe algebraically in the revised 
budget constraint 
(2)                                            𝐶 ≤ 𝑤ℎ − (𝑚𝑎𝑥 ℎ − ℎ!, 0 )𝑝 + (𝐹 + 𝑉). 
In equation (2), h1 is the time a child spends in Head Start. During the hours a child participates 
in Head Start, a mother’s childcare cost is 0. For each hour a mother works in excess of the time 
her child participates in Head Start, she has the same take home wage (w-p) as in equation (1). 
 Mothers with access to Head Start experience income and substitution effects of opposing 
directions. The magnitude and net allocation resulting from these effects depends on a mother’s 
consumption-leisure allocation prior to receiving access to Head Start.2 The effect of access to 
Head Start on the labor-force participation of mothers initially not working is unambiguously 
positive. Mothers working h hours before enrolling their children in Head Start, where h1 < h < 
h2, experience an insolated income effect, leading them to increase leisure consumption and 
decrease hours worked. The effect on mothers who initially worked between 0 < h < h1 hours is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  The analysis uses standard assumptions of monotonicity, concavity, and transitivity in preferences from 
microeconomic theory. 
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theoretically ambiguous. The model cannot predict whether the income or substitution effect 
dominates. The dominant effect depends on the magnitudes of w and w – p, as well as a mother’s 
preferences U. I demonstrate this through the indifference curves in Figures 1 B-C. For a mother 
with indifference curve I1, as in Figure 1B, the substitution effect dominates following an 
increase in the effective wage. This mother would increase her labor-force participation when 
she has access to Head Start. Meanwhile, for a mother with indifference curve I2, as in Figure 
1C, the income effect dominates when her effective wage increases and she decreases her labor-
force participation. Experimental data provides the best lens to construct indifference curves and 
model the decisions faced by mothers in this ambiguous section of the Head Start impact.  
Adding an additional complication, Head Start is a means-tested program, so mothers are 
only eligible to enroll their children if their income falls below 130% of the national poverty 
level. I represent the cutoff of a mother’s Head Start eligibility in Figure 1A when she works 
more than h2 hours. When h > h2, her household income is greater than the 130% of poverty 
level Head Start eligibility cutoff, represented in Figure 1 as I*, and she looses access to Head 
Start. The eligibility scheme of Head Start disincentives mothers earning below I* from working 
more than h2 hours. The discrete value of h2 depends on a mother’s wage (w) and non-maternal 
family income (F+V).  
 The effects of Head Start on a mother’s budget constraint extend beyond a child’s Head 
Start participation. For example, consider the model of labor market decisions that includes the 
returns to job experience and tenure shown in Figure 1D. Mothers who are brought into the labor 
force as a result of access to Head Start may experience returns on job tenure and experience, 
represented by w’ > w. Following the completion of Head Start, all mothers enroll their children 
in a public kindergarten program, free at all income levels. Mothers who entered into the labor 
force while their children were in Head Start may face an increase in take home wages, while the 
effects of income and substitution effects are similar to those described in Figure 1A. 
 Economic theory provides strong insight into the labor decisions a mother faces when 
considering childcare costs. However, the models fall short of predicting the effects of access to 
a subsidized childcare service, such as Head Start, when the magnitudes of the income and 
substitution effects are ambiguous. Empirical analysis can fill in some of the gaps in economic 
theory by predicting which outcomes, if any, are most affected by access to Head Start and for 
whom the effects are most significant. 
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II. Literature Review 
 Since its inception, Head Start has been the subject of extensive empirical study. Nearly 
all of the existing empirical literature has analyzed the role Head Start plays in a child’s social 
and academic development. Absent from the literature is a thorough analysis of the program’s 
effect on parent outcomes. Head Start acts, in many ways, as a simple childcare subsidy. I argue 
in this paper that the unique scale, design, and political significance of Head Start within the 
childcare sphere. Thus, I briefly review the literature studying the effects of Head Start on child 
outcomes. Second, I thoroughly survey empirical studies on the impact childcare subsidies. 
Finally, I review the history of Head Start with close attention to the programs Head Start to for 
participating parents. 
A. Overview of Head Start Effects on Participants’ Academic and Social Outcomes 
Extensive study of the academic and social outcomes affected by a child’s participation 
in Head Start began soon after the program’s establishment in 1965. Existing research has been 
conducted using a variety of samples and analytical strategies and has evolved alongside Head 
Start. I provide only a brief overview of some of the recent and influential findings on the role 
Head Start plays in a child’s short- and long-term development to frame the contemporary 
understanding of Head Start.3 
The Head Start Impact Study is the most recent and exhaustive study to identify Head 
Start effects on participants’ learning and social development. The Head Start Impact Study 
collects data from a national experimental study to observe cognitive and non-cognitive 
outcomes for Head Start participants. Among students with access to, at most, one year of Head 
Start (four-year-old cohort), students entered kindergarten with significantly higher literacy and 
verbal skills. However, these benefits dissipated almost entirely by the end of the initial 
observation period (first grade). For students with access to, at most, two years of Head Start 
(three-year-old cohort), the study finds early benefits in literacy and math that fade by the end of 
the student’s first year in Head Start (Head Start Impact Study Final Report 2010). A similar 
“fading out” effect is well documented in the longitudinal Head Start literature (Deming 2009, 
Currie and Thomas 1995, e.g.). 
Despite the persistent convergence in academic performance between Head Start 
participants and non-participants, Head Start participants tend to have better long-term academic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gibbs et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive treatment of the historical and present Head Start literature. 
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and social outcomes than non-participants. Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) use sibling data 
from the PSID to estimate the effect of Head Start participation on adult social and economic 
outcomes (income, education, and incarceration rates). They find, through OLS estimates, that 
white Head Start participants in their sample were 21.7% more likely to graduate from high 
school. Black Head Start participants in their sample, however, were 11.7% less likely than 
nonparticipants to be incarcerated or charged with a crime as an adult. Moreover, Ludwig and 
Miller (2007) find suggestive evidence, through regression discontinuity analysis, of positive and 
sustained educational and health impacts resulting from Head Start enrollment. Whereas 
educational benefits appear to fade out in the short term, the empirical literature suggests positive 
lifetime impacts of Head Start on various social, academic, and economic outcomes. 
As HSIS data allows researchers to observe experimental Head Start data, analysis of the 
effects of Head Start has taken on renewed interest. Sabol and Chase-Lansdale (2014) uses HSIS 
data to study parental changes in educational outcomes and the transitions into the labor force 
through Head Start. They focus their analysis on changes in education level from the baseline 
observation. In their analysis, they find suggestive evidence of positive educational returns to 
Head Start access, primarily concentrated among parents with some college education but less 
than a Bachelor’s Degree. They also labor-force outcomes of parents out of the labor force, pre-
treatment, who move into the labor force during the HSIS observation period. Among these 
parents, they do not find a significant treatment effect. Their brief treatment of labor-force 
outcomes in the HSIS sample looks narrowly at mothers transitioning into the labor force. In this 
paper, I expand the analysis to consider the dynamics of transitions between employment states 
across years for the full sample of parents, rather than a restricted set of parents initially out of 
the labor force. 
B. Survey of Empirical Literature Studying Effects of Childcare Subsidies 
 Over the last twenty years, existing research analyzing the employment decisions of 
parents of young children, particularly maternal employment, has expanded dramatically. Jean 
Kimmel (1995) finds that the price of childcare significantly affects single mothers’ employment 
decisions. Through probit analysis of cross-sectional data from the 1987 and 1988 Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, Kimmel finds that the price elasticity of employment differed 
among single by race. She found that white mothers in her sample were highly price elastic        
(-1.36) to childcare subsidies, while single black mothers’ employment was far less price elastic 
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(-0.35). Kimmel’s estimates that full subsidization of early childcare could lead to a 132-percent 
increase in single white mothers’ likelihood of employment. Despite estimates of such large and 
heterogeneous effects, Kimmel provides no explanation for these racial differences. Berger and 
Black (1992) find effects similar to those described by Kimmel. They run probit analysis using a 
dataset of single mothers eligible for Louisville 4C and Kentucky Title XX childcare subsidy 
programs to estimate the subsidy effect on the likelihood of labor-force participation. They 
estimate a 25.3% response in employment rates of poor single mothers to the subsidy. They do 
not find, however, that a subsidy would have a significant effect on hours worked. Their probit 
analysis, while insightful, may lack external validity due to a small, geographically concentrated 
sample. 
 Tekin (2007) extends the literature through analysis of data collected post-welfare 
reform. He uses data from the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NASF) to estimate 
part- and full-time employment decisions in a behavior model of single mothers. In his model, a 
mother chooses to work (full-time, part-time, or not at all), whether to pay for childcare, and 
whether to accept a subsidy. Tekin estimates the effects of a subsidy on a mother’s a 
employment status using a multinomial logit regression. He finds that mothers working full-time 
have stronger wage elasticity to the full-time wage rate than part-time mothers to the part-time 
wage rate (0.874 and 0.431, respectively). Their findings suggest that mothers who work full-
time are more sensitive to the price of childcare (and, thus, subsidization of childcare programs) 
than mothers working part-time. 
 The aforementioned studies focus exclusively on subsidy effects on poor single mothers. 
Michalopoulos et al. (1992) use SIPP data to simulate differential childcare decisions between 
single and married mothers. They estimate a structural model in which mothers already in the 
labor force choose simultaneously their child care consumption and labor market participation. 
From their estimates, they conclude that single and married mothers’ hours worked are price 
inelastic with respect to childcare subsidies (0.0014 and 0.0018, respectively). However, they 
only consider mothers already in the labor force. This result shows a relative inelasticity in the 
move from part- to full-time employment in the presence of a subsidy.  
 Accessible childcare and subsidization of early childhood care and education programs 
has been studied outside of its effects on labor-force participation. Martinez-Beck (2009) 
analyzes economic outcomes for recipients of the Child Care Subsidy. Through regression 
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analysis the American Community Survey/Supplemental Survey for 2001 (ACS/SS01), 
Martinez-Beck identifies somewhat contradictory economic effects of the CCS in her logistic 
regression analysis. She finds that CCS recipients were more likely to remain employed across 
quarters, yet they were less likely to exceed the threshold for CCS eligibility than non-recipients.  
From the literature presented, two trends emerge. Childcare subsidies appear to have a 
zero-to-slightly positive effect on mothers’ labor-force participation. However, the effects of 
subsidies appear to be heterogeneous with among subgroups. I consider these effects in my 
empirical methodology in Section IV. The literature surveyed, however, relies heavily on 
national longitudinal studies vulnerable to selection bias. Because mothers are able to choose 
their labor status during all periods of observation, it is not possible to isolate the effects of a 
childcare subsidy on the outcome of observation. I extend the existing literature using recent data 
from the experimental Head Start Impact Study, which allows me to identify causal effects of 
access to subsidized Head Start on mothers’ labor-force outcomes. 
C. Head Start- Program Overview 
Head Start was launched in 1965 as a War on Poverty program under President Lyndon 
B. Johnson. The program has evolved from a summer pre-kindergarten program into a full 
academic year or calendar year early childhood care and education program, serving poor 
children age 3-5. The program is operated by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, whose ideals are reflected in Head Start’s mission of holistically promoting a 
participant’s academic preparation, physical wellness, social development. Additionally, Head 
Start emphasizes the role of the family in fostering a positive developmental environment 
(Aguiar 2012). Head Start serves nearly 1 million students each year, with federal appropriations 
for Head Start in 2013 totaled $7.57 billion (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services 2014). Head Start is locally administered, and all affiliates must adhere to the national 
program guidelines. 
A means-tested program, the criteria for Head Start eligibility were most recently 
enumerated in the bipartisan Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act of 2007. Head Start 
serves, primarily, children of families whose income falls below the Federal poverty line 
(enrollment from families with income between the poverty line and 130 percent of the poverty 
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line is limited to 35 percent).4 Children become eligible to participate at age 3 and may 
participate until they are of compulsory school age. Finally, programs must make at least 10 
percent of enrollment available to students with disabilities.  
Of greatest interest to this study is the degree of involvement Head Start asks of the 
parents in the program. Head Start emphasizes positive parenting and family development in its 
program objectives. A Head Start center begins its family partnership with a mandatory goal 
setting session and follows up with a participant’s family throughout the duration of the program. 
A Head Start center regularly connects parents to continuing education opportunities, 
employment training programs, psychological and substance abuse counseling services, and 
emergency crisis assistance. While not compulsory, the Head Start performance standards 
instruct that parents be “encouraged to observe children as often as possible and to participate 
with children in group activities” (US Department of Health and Human Services 2006). The 
services provided and expectations set by Head Start oblige active parent involvement. Through 
the institutional support in finding a job and achieving balance between family and work, Head 
Start further pushes participating parents into the labor force. These program characteristics, in 
addition to the national scope of the program, make Head Start singular among childcare 
programs in the United States. These unique program components motivate study of Head Start’s 
unique affect on parents’ employment decisions.  
III. Data 
This paper uses data from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS) to conduct my analysis. 
The HSIS was conducted to satisfy a 1998 congressional mandate to study the effects of Head 
Start on child learning and development and parental behavior. The initial study, conducted 
2002-2006, followed a nationally representative sample of first-time applicants to Head Start in 
2002.5 The HSIS followed two cohorts of Head Start applicants: a three-year-old cohort of 
students with two years of Head Start eligibility and a four-year-old cohort of students with one 
year of Head Start eligibility. The study tracked educational, developmental, and social growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Up to 10% of enrollment can fail to meet these eligibility criteria if the family has demonstrated abrupt financial 
hardship or successfully appeals for an exemption. 
5 To ensure that the HSIS did not affect Head Start enrollment, the study only collected data from centers where 
applicant demand overwhelmed center capacity. Thus, the sample is representative of Head Start applicants to 
overflow centers- a nuanced, yet important, distinction from the population of Head Start applicants. This sample 
was representative of 84.5% of the total universe of three- and four-year-olds newly entering Head Start across the 
country. 
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during a child’s pre-elementary through early elementary studies. The first round of the study 
followed both cohorts until the spring of the child’s first grade year. In addition to collecting data 
on children’s performance, the HSIS conducted annual surveys of the cohorts’ parents. These 
surveys also collected data on parenting behaviors, interactions with children, involvement in 
their children’s school, and basic economic and demographic information. 
 The data in Table 1 describes the Head Start Impact Study sample. Column (1) 
summarizes descriptive characteristics of the HSIS sample in the 2002 HSIS parent survey. To 
give context for the demographics of Head Start participants, I summarize data from the 2002 
Current Population Survey (CPS) in column (2).6 Clearly apparent, parents in the HSIS sample, 
meant to represent the population of Head Start applicants, is generally less educated and has 
lower income than the national average. The average monthly household income of a HSIS 
participant is $1,647, less than 30% of the national average monthly income. In contrast with 
national averages, mothers of Head Start applicants are predominately nonwhite, had their first 
child in their early twenties, and have less than a high school education. Mothers and fathers of 
Head Start applicants in the study were less likely to work full-time than parents in the CPS 
sample. Only 33.4% of mothers in the 2002 HSIS parents survey reported full-time labor 
employment. 
 The HSIS used randomization to evaluate the effects of Head Start. From a sample of 
Head Start centers at enrollment capacity, first-time applicants were assigned by random lottery 
into a “treatment” or “control” group. Children in the “treatment group” were able to enroll Head 
Start in the year they applied. Children in the control group of the four-year-old cohort were not 
given access to Head Start. Children in the control group of the three-year-old cohort (who, 
potentially, had another year of Head Start eligibility) were not given access to Head Start in 
2002, but allowed to reapply in the second year of their eligibility. Randomization, through the 
lottery, balances observed and unobserved characteristics between the treatment and control 
groups. Therefore, any contrast in observed outcomes between the groups should be a consistent 
estimate of the treatment effect of access to Head Start. 
 Descriptive analysis of the sample verifies that such balance was achieved in practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I summarize data from the March 2002 CPS. To allow for the closest comparison to the HSIS sample of parents 
with Head Start-aged children, I restrict the sample to parents of children ages 5 and below.  
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Table 1 breaks the sample down by cohort and test group. Columns (5) and (8) give the clearest 
insight into the degree of similarity between test groups. With a single exception, treatment and 
control groups in both cohorts are statistically indistinguishable in the initial observation. The 
single exception, a larger percentage of white mothers in the control group of the three-year-old 
cohort than in the treatment group, may simply have occurred by chance. The relative uniformity 
of the test groups between cohorts controls against the confounding influence of observed group 
characteristics in my analysis.7 
 The bottom section of Table 1 documents instances of imperfect adherence to test group 
assignment. While the HSIS had influence over study participants’ access to Head Start, it did 
not enforce group assignment. Therefore, many participants assigned to the treatment group did 
not participate in Head Start (designated “no-shows”). Some participants assigned to the control 
group were able to enroll in Head Start (designated “crossovers”), often at a different Head Start 
center than the one designated in the HSIS random assignment. Analysis using randomized 
treatment group assignment gives me consistent estimators of the effects of access to Head Start, 
but violations of random assignment make it difficult to detect the impact of Head Start over 
time. While these violations may obscure Head Start’s impact, any effects found to be significant 
using the randomized assignments can be attributed to Head Start causally. 
Throughout my analysis, I consider the possible effects of participant attrition on my 
results. The HSIS saw lower response rates among parents in the control group in each survey 
year in the full sample. Inclusion in my analysis is predicated on response in the 2002 HSIS 
survey. Therefore, I am most interested in attrition trends within the restricted sample of mothers 
with complete 2002 responses. Table 2 displays OLS estimates of the effect of test group 
assignment on nonresponse in each survey following the baseline survey. I regress an indicator 
of survey nonresponse on test group assignment and the set of covariates that I use in my labor 
force analysis (listed in Table 3). From Table 2, it is clear that mothers in the treatment group 
had higher response rates in my restricted sample. The effect of group assignment is most 
pronounced in the four-year-old cohort, wherein the effect is statistically different from a null 
effect in Year 2 and marginally significant in Year 3. The effect grows over time, both in 
magnitude and significance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A technical note, it was the children, not parents, who were randomly assigned through lottery. The balance of the 
child sample described in the HSIS Final Report lends further confidence to the quality of randomization. 
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Full Sample National
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
White 0.303 0.667 0.270 0.316 -2.190** 0.325 0.321 0.130
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Black 0.307 0.104 0.324 0.349 1.420 0.229 0.228 0.020
(0.46) (0.31) (0.47) (0.48) (0.42) (0.42)
Hispanic 0.360 0.176 0.381 0.306 0.830 0.412 0.418 -0.230
(0.48) (0.38) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49)
Age when had first child 20.498 25.548 20.612 20.387 1.060 20.421 20.522 -0.44
(4.45) (5.46) (4.58) (4.39) (4.37) (4.39)
Married 0.447 0.806 0.424 0.443 -0.840 0.456 0.486 -1.17
(0.50) (0.40) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Born in USA 0.684 0.823 0.739 0.726 0.490 0.622 0.621 -0.44
(0.46) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45) (0.49) (0.49)
$1,647 $5,842 $1,609 $1,603 0.10 $1,684 $1,709 -0.36
(1142) (5895) (1168) (1137) (1068) (1213)
Highest Grade Completed 11.268 13.369 11.396 11.336 0.630 11.174 11.087 0.770
(1.95) (2.83) (1.80) (2.00) (2.03) (2.03)
High School Graduate 0.608 0.872 0.646 0.635 0.540 0.571 0.563 0.29
(0.49) (0.33) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Number of Children 2.423 2.124 2.424 2.366 1.030 2.461 2.428 0.510
(1.22) (1.13) (1.24) (1.15) (1.25) (1.18)
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics
HSIS 2002 Parent Survey Full Sample, CPS March 2002 Restricted Sample
Monthly Household 
Income (2006 Dollars)
Four-Year-Old CohortThree-Year-Old Cohort
Food Stamps 0.476 0.110 0.514 0.486 1.200 0.426 0.469 -1.650
(0.50) (0.31) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Mother Works Full Time 0.334 0.409 0.339 0.334 0.190 0.334 0.323 0.430
(0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Mother Works Part Time 0.160 0.203 0.167 0.166 0.090 0.142 0.165 -1.200
(0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37)
Dad full time 0.745 0.875 0.748 0.707 1.380 0.765 0.750 0.490
(0.44) (0.33) (0.43) (0.46) (0.42) (0.43)
Dad part time 0.089 0.045 0.081 0.093 -0.660 0.096 0.089 0.340
(0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
Crossover 0.049 0.133 0.106
(0.216) (0.34) (0.31)
No Show 0.113 0.164 0.223
(0.32) (0.37) (0.42)
N         4,442 11,513                  1,464            985      2,449         1,182             811 1,993      
Note: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics summarizing the HSIS sample.Column (1) summarizes full sample characteristics. 
Column (2) uses CPS 2002 data to describe characteristics of mothers with children under 5, a proxy for mothers of children of Head 
Start age. Columns (3) and (6) summarize average characteristics for parents in the treatment group for the 3 and 4 year-old cohorts, 
respectively. Columns (4) and (7) summarize average group characteristics for the 3 and 4 year-old cohorts, respectively. Columns (5) 
and (8) present regression estimates of the difference in observed characteristic by test group in standard deviations.  With the 
exception of Columns (5) and (8) and where otherwise specified, values are given as a percentage of the sample. N provides the total 
sample size. For most observations, the actual number of responses to survey questions was slightly lower than N (the response rate to 
the 2002 HSIS parent survey was approximately 80%).
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Three-Year-Old Cohort Four-Year-Old Cohort
(1) (2)
Year 1 -0.00433 0.0152
-0.0132 -0.0134
Year 2 0.018 0.0438**
-0.0156 -0.0189
Year 3 0.0232 0.0347*
-0.0166 -0.0188
Year 4 0.0255
-0.0178
n 1572 1312
Note: Table 2 gives OLS estimates of attrition in the HSIS 
parent surveys. Each outcome variable is a binary indicator 
of survey response, The values listed in Columns (1) and (2) 
are the OLS estimates of the coefficient on a binary variable 
indicating test group, where 1 = treatment group.                
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table 2- Attrition Analysis
HSIS 2002-2006 Surveys
 
  
Table 3- Regression Covariates 
Mother's race (Black, Hispanic) 
Mother was a teen mom 
Mother’s age in 2002 
Mother is a high school graduate 
Mother is married 
Number of children 
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Nonresponse from parents in the control group is unsurprising. Parents in the control 
group do not benefit directly from inclusion in the HSIS study and may feel less compelled to 
complete the lengthy survey in each year. Differences between the three-year-old and four-year-
old cohorts support this explanation. Participants in the three-year-old cohort had the option to 
reapply to Head Start in year 1, while participants in the four-year-old cohort were ineligible. A 
model in which models who are more connected to Head Start are more likely to complete a 
HSIS survey would predict greater nonresponse rates in the four-year-old cohort. If this were the 
case, then attrition in the three-year-old cohort will give greater weight to treatment effects on 
mothers in the control group who received access to Head Start, and will dampen my estimates 
of treatment effects in years 2-4. While this model of nonresponse fits the data, it fails to predict 
the effect of attrition on results within the four-year-old cohort. Thus, I rely on inclusion of 
covariates in my analysis to reduce variance and the robustness of my analysis to determine any 
bias in my estimates within the four-year-old cohort.  
IV. Empirical Methodology 
 My analysis exploits the randomization into Head Start access in the HSIS sample.8 I 
examine for the three- and four-year-old cohorts separately because “treatment” between the 
cohorts differs. Difference-in-means analysis yields estimates of the effect of Head Start access 
on an outcome measure without bias. My basic model, which I employ for each outcome 
domain, uses a simple linear regression: 
(3)   𝑦!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐻𝑆! +   𝜌!  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  𝐻𝑆!!!!! +   𝝋𝑿𝒊 +   𝜀!,! , 
where yi,t is the outcome of interest (mother’s full-time work, for example), HSi is a dummy 
indicator of treatment group assignment, Yeart is a dummy indicator for each year t of 
observation, and YeartHSi  is the interaction between the year and Head Start treatment group 
assignment, and Xi is a row vector containing the covariates listed in Table 3.9 The parameter α 
captures the baseline level of y for the average control mother, β captures the average baseline 
difference in level of y between treatment and control mothers (which, from random sampling 
and confirmed by Table 1, should be nearly 0), φ is a column vector capturing covariate effects, 
and εi,t captures the error. With the model specified as in equation (3), the ρt capture the effect of 
access to Head Start on the outcome y in year t for each year following the initial observation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I focus my analysis on mothers’ labor-force participation rates (as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), full-
time employment status, and part-time employment status. 9	  t ranges from 1 to T, where T = 3 for the four-year-old cohort and T = 4 for the three-year-old cohort.	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 Equation (3) attributes any differential changes in means among treatment groups to 
Head Start access. However, broader economic conditions may also play a significant role in 
determining labor-force outcomes for the entire HSIS sample. To account for any variation in 
outcomes caused by changes across years, I modify the basic model as follows: 
(4)  𝑦!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐻𝑆! + 𝜇!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  !!!! +   𝜌!  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  𝐻𝑆!!!!! +   𝝋𝑿𝒊 +   𝜀!,! 
where all notation remains as previously defined and 𝜇! captures year t fixed effects.  
I run my model with and without the covariate vector Xi. The covariates I include in Xi 
appear in the HSIS analysis or the empirical literature. While most of the characteristics included 
in Xi are not time-varying (race, age when first gave birth, e.g.), some characteristics are 
observed in and can change each year (marital status, education level, e.g). Because these 
variables change over time, it is possible that observed demographic characteristics may, in fact, 
be correlated with Head Start treatment across time. To avoid biased estimates, I use dummy 
indicators for a mother’s status in 2002 as the demographic covariate in the final regression. 
Inclusion of covariates helps my model account for unexplained variance. However, predication 
of my model on completion of the 2002 survey restricts the sample available for analysis. This is 
a significant drawback, because a smaller sample limits the variation my model can explain. 
Consequently, I present full sample estimates of equation (4) with and without covariates. 
 The empirical literature, HSIS, and theoretical model suggest that effects of Head Start 
should vary across subgroups. In practice, I interact Head Start treatment with demographic 
characteristics to study subgroup effects. The use of difference-in-means interactions preserves 
the statistical power of the model while allowing for subgroup analyses. This potentially reveals 
subgroup impacts in opposing directions hidden in full sample analysis. For example, the 
substitution effect of Head Start treatment may dominate labor-force outcomes for single 
mothers, for whom only one parent contributes to household income, while an income effect 
might dominate for married mothers, who have a significant source of non-labor income (spousal 
earnings). These opposing effects would result in a small effect when aggregated but represent 
treatment effects among subgroups. 
 I study heterogeneity in Head Start effects across groups using equation (5):  
(5)  𝑦!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐻𝑆! +    𝜇!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  !!!! + 𝜏𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! +      𝜌!  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  𝐻𝑆!!!!! +      𝜃!  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!!!!! + 𝜅  𝐻𝑆!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! +      𝛾!  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!  𝐻𝑆!!!!! 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! +   𝝋𝑿𝒊 +   𝜀!,! , 
where Groupi is a dummy indicator for subgroup and 𝛾t captures year-subgroup-treatment  
 Light 18 
effects. The model tests the full sample for changes in y resulting from access to Head Start with 
greater statistical power than analysis using a restricted sample. 
 As I describe in Section III, I use lottery assignment into the group that receives access to 
Head Start as the treatment parameter, rather than Head Start attendance. Using Head Start 
enrollment would allow me to study directly the effect of participation in Head Start on labor-
force outcomes for participating mothers. However, I would not be able to draw causal 
inferences from the comparisons. If participation in Head Start were correlated with some 
unobservable characteristic related to labor-force outcomes, my estimates would be biased. Such 
a scenario is easy to conceive; if mothers who want to work are more driven to seek out childcare 
for their children, then they might find a way to circumvent control group assignment to gain 
access to Head Start. Using randomized group assignment eliminates any bias introduced by 
imperfect group adherence. Randomization ensures that any differences in outcomes result from 
assignment to a group with access to Head Start. Therefore, my estimates rely on intent-to-treat 
(ITT) group assignment to estimate causal effects of access to Head Start on labor-force 
outcomes of interest. 
V. Results 
A. Three-Year-Old Cohort 
 I study “treatment” effects of Head Start access on three labor-force outcomes: labor-
force participation (as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), full-time employment, and 
part-time employment. In Table 4, I present OLS estimates of equations (3) and (4). In columns 
(1), (4), and (7), I regress each labor-force outcome y on the year-treatment group interaction, as 
specified in equation (3). I control for year fixed effects in the regression output listed in 
columns (2), (5), and (8). Finally, for the estimates listed in columns (3), (6), and (9), I run the 
full regression with year fixed effects and a set of baseline individual characteristics as 
covariates. I focus my attention on these estimates from the model with covariates, which is the 
best statistical fit with the data. In most instances, the sign of the estimates of Head Start access 
are consistent between the models that include year fixed effects, while the magnitudes of the 
magnitudes of the point estimates vary slightly. I plot these estimates in Figure 2. 
I document a 3.5% increase (2.09 percentage points) in labor-force participation among 
sample mothers due to access to Head Start during the “treatment” year— the first year a child in 
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the treatment group is granted access to Head Start.10 The treatment effect on labor-force 
participation oscillates in the years following the treatment year; I find that access to Head Start 
causes greater than 6.5% (4 percentage points) increases in labor-force participation in years 2 
and 4, while I observe a null effect in the third year. 
 A null effect of treatment on labor-force participation may arise for three different 
reasons: it may reflect no change in all labor-force outcomes; it may be the result of cancelling 
flows between full- and part-time employment and mothers leaving the work force; or it may be 
the result of mothers transitioning between part-time and full-time employment. The last 
explanation best describes treatment effects in the first year of observation. I find a statistically 
significant 14% (4.81 percentage points) increase in full-time employment rates for treatment 
mothers accompanying a 17.5% (2.92 percentage point) decrease in part-time employment. 
Thus, the modest change in labor-force participation rates hides a relatively large treatment effect 
of access to Head Start on full-time employment.	  
 In year 3, the effects of access to Head Start on the sample decreases across outcomes. 
This makes sense because all children in the three-year-old cohort are able to enroll in free public 
kindergarten. Thus, in year 3, control mothers’ budget constraints resemble those of mothers in 
the treatment group. The point estimates in Table 4 bear out this theoretical prediction. In year 4 
of the study, however, I estimate an 18% (6.05 percentage point) increase in the likelihood of 
full-time employment and a 7.4% (4.16 percentage point) increase in labor-force participation 
among mothers in the treatment group. While not statistically significant, these estimates may be 
suggestive of a lag in treatment effects within the sample. 
Motivated by the existing literature and the HSIS methodology, I analyze treatment-
subgroup interactions to test for heterogeneity in outcomes. My theoretical model suggests that a 
mother’s response to Head Start access depends on household income and the extent to which a 
mother is already working. I present estimates of the treatment-subgroup interaction effects in 
Table 5 and in Figures 4-5. In year 1, I find positive treatment effects for mothers already in the 
labor force and black mothers (who have the greatest labor-force participation rate in the pre-
treatment HSIS sample). I estimate a 29% (12.8 percentage points) increase in full-time 
employment for black mothers resulting from access to Head Start. I find the strongest negative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Hereafter, I refer to the “treatment” year (the first year an HSIS participant can access Head Start) as Year 1, the 
next year as Year 2, etc. I refer to the initial observation as the baseline year or pre-treatment year. 
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effects of Head Start access on labor-force participation rates among white mothers and mothers 
not in the labor force pre-treatment.11 For all demographic subgroups, I estimate a null or small 
treatment effect in year 1. 
Subgroup effects stemming from access to Head Start appear heterogeneous with respect 
to two distinct categories in the latter years of the HSIS.12 For black mothers and single mothers, 
access to Head Start increases the likelihood of working full-time. For mothers, Hispanic 
mothers and mothers not previously in the labor force, access to Head Start leads to increased 
labor-force participation. Moreover, the effect appears to trend positively in the subsequent years 
following “treatment.” Hispanic mothers had the lowest labor-force participation rate pre-
treatment of all subgroups analyzed. I find a lagged positive treatment effect for Hispanic 
mothers on full- and part-time labor-force participation. 
For the remaining subgroups (white mothers and mothers who worked before receiving 
access to Head Start), access to Head Start has a slight negative effect on labor-force outcomes. 
This effect is clearly visible in Figure 3C. In the treatment year, Head Start leads to a dramatic 
increase in part-time employment, which, for many of these mothers, is a reduction in labor-
force participation. In the final years of the survey, these mothers are slightly less likely to be 
employed part-time than mothers in the control group, reflecting a response by similar mothers 
in the control group to universal access to public kindergarten across the sample. In the year 4 
survey, white mothers and mothers in the labor force pre-treatment who received access are far 
less likely to participate in the labor force than their counterparts in the control group. An income 
effect of access to Head Start that pulls mothers out of the labor force is most pronounced among 
white mothers, initially. However, by the end of the study, all of these subgroups of mothers are 
far less likely to be in the labor force as a result of access to Head Start. I estimate a highly 
significant 16.6% decrease in labor-force participation during in year 4 among mothers who 
worked full-time before receiving access to Head Start.  
The divide that appears in my analysis of heterogeneous outcomes produces the same 
groups formed when each of the subgroups are split by baseline real income. Black, Hispanic, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Labor force non-participation, in this case, is not necessarily non-productive; mothers who are enrolled in 
education or job training programs are considered “not working,” for example. 
12 I study heterogeneous effects using subgroups that appear frequently in the empirical literature studying mothers’ 
sensitivity to childcare subsidies. However, these subgroups are not mutually exclusive. For example, I study 
treatment-race and treatment-marital status interactions. I find a higher incidence of single parent households among 
black mothers than white and Hispanic mothers. 
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and single mothers, on average, reported income below the average income for the full HSIS 
sample in the pre-treatment survey, while mothers in the labor force and white mothers reported 
average monthly incomes above the full HSIS average in the pre-treatment survey. Though many 
estimates are not statistically significant, such clustering of outcomes among is suggestive of 
heterogeneous responses to Head Start. I consider the theoretical explanations of such 
heterogeneity with respect to the labor model in Section VII. 
B. Four-Year-Old Cohort 
 I repeat my analysis with the four-year-old cohort and give estimates of the basic model 
in Table 6 and Figure 5. I disaggregate the data by cohort because access to Head Start differs 
between cohorts during the HSIS observation period. As with the three-year-old cohort, I 
observe positive treatment effects on labor-force participation during the treatment year. I 
estimate that access to Head Start led to a 10.9% (6.46 percentage points) increase in mothers’ 
labor-force participation in the “treatment year.” The year 1 treatment effect on labor-force 
participation is driven by modest increases in both part- and full-time employment, as well as 
mothers looking for work. In year 2, the aggregate treatment effects dampen to small and 
statistically indistinguishable from null levels, as is the case in the three-year-old cohort. This 
dissipation is consistent across cohorts.13 
In my heterogeneity analysis, I find that subgroup-treatment interaction effects for the 
four-year-old cohort resemble those in the three-year-old cohort in sign. I present estimates of 
treatment-subgroup interaction effects in Table 7 and plot them in Figures 6-7.14 Treatment 
effects are positive for single mothers and black mothers in year 1, particularly effects on full-
time employment. For black mothers in the sample, I observe a statistically significant 41% (18.6 
percentage points) increase in full-time employment due to Head Start access in the “treatment” 
year. Hispanic mothers in the treatment group were 7.3% more likely to be working part-time 
than Hispanic mothers in the control group in year 1, a 48.2% increase in part-time participation. 
White mothers in the treatment group, meanwhile, were less likely to work in year 1 than white 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Because the HSIS follows participants through first grade, the HSIS collects one fewer observation for the four-
year-old cohort than the three-year-old cohort. Thus, a participant enters kindergarten in year 2 of the study. 
14 As in my heterogeneity analysis of the three-year-old cohort, I graph subgroup separately based on subgroup 
average baseline monthly income. Figure 6 plots estimates of treatment-subgroup interactions for subgroups with 
average income above the HSIS average, while Figure 7 plots estimates of treatment-subgroup interactions for 
subgroups with average income below the HSIS average. 
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mothers in the control group; I observe a marginally significant 32.5% (10.1 percentage points) 
decrease in full-time employment among white mothers in the treatment group.  
Subgroup effects in years 2 and 3 are slightly less volatile for the four-year-old cohort 
than in the three-year-old cohort. Similar to the three-year-old cohort, treatment effects bend 
slightly towards 0% for most subgroups across outcomes. None of the treatment effects are 
statistically distinguishable from null effects in year 2. In year 3, I observe a slight divergence 
from null effects. For many subgroups of mothers, the treatment-subgroup interaction in year 3 is 
similar in magnitude and direction to the year 1 treatment effect, although the effects are 
estimated with less precision. 
C. Robustness Check 
 A few adjustments test the robustness of my model. To ensure that my results do not arise 
from my choice of covariates or omitted variable bias, I run my full sample regression different 
covariate controls. I exclude variables used in my final model, substitute complementary 
observations (marital status in 2002 for both parents in the household in 2002, e.g.), and add 
other demographic variables observed in the HSIS dataset (pre-treatment depression status, 
nationality, e.g.).15 Qualitatively, my results are unchanged, though the point estimates vary as 
expected across the different model specifications. In general, the sample is unchanged when 
covariates are added or removed, as the sample still relies on survey response in 2002. 
 I also check the robustness of my estimates by limiting the sample to parents who 
completed the HSIS survey in each year. Restricting the sample to HSIS participants with a full 
set of observations reduces the noise from inconsistent sample response, but significantly 
decreases the sample size. I compare OLS estimates from the restricted and full samples in 
Figure 8. With the exception of Figure 8E, my OLS estimates appear to be consistent with the 
restricted sample. In both cohorts, I find that restricting the sample to mothers who report in each 
year dampens the magnitude of my estimated Head Start treatment effect slightly, but they are 
generally consistent in sign.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Omitting and adding demographic variables generally leaves the sample unchanged. First, I study robustness to 
the set of covariates listed in Table 3. Next, I consider replacements for variables listed in Table 3. For example, I 
use an indicator variable coding for both parents living in the household to replace marital status and an indicator for 
the HSIS participant child as the oldest child in the household to replace number of children in household. Finally, I 
run my regressions using the covariates listed in Table 3 with other observed demographic characteristics from the 
2002 pre-treatment survey, including depression status, nationality, language spoken at home, and real income. My 
analysis is robust with respect to these specifications of the model. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Pre-Treatment
Treatment-Year 1 0.00317 0.00424 0.0209 -0.0189 0.0234 0.0481** -0.00755 -0.0418** -0.0292
(0.0160) (0.0226) (0.0261) (0.0159) (0.0214) (0.0244) (0.0132) (0.0199) (0.0229)
Treatment- Year 2 0.0258 0.0170 0.0417 0.0138 -0.00103 0.0179 0.0121 0.00507 0.0140
(0.0165) (0.0260) (0.0295) (0.0167) (0.0256) (0.0295) (0.0142) (0.0220) (0.0255)
Treatment- Year 3 0.0345** -0.0161 -0.00684 0.0352** -0.0401 -0.00755 -0.00500 0.0111 -0.00795
(0.0166) (0.0264) (0.0299) (0.0170) (0.0270) (0.0310) (0.0140) (0.0226) (0.0258)
Treatment- Year 4 0.0546*** 0.0410 0.0436 0.104*** 0.0381 0.0605* -0.00147 -0.00143 -0.0269
(0.0168) (0.0264) (0.0301) (0.0175) (0.0275) (0.0319) (0.0144) (0.0232) (0.0275)
Year Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Covariates N N Y N N Y N N Y
n-observations 9,404 9,404 6,803 9,404 9,404 6,803 9,404 9,404 6,803
n-mothers 2,218 2,218 1,573 2,218 2,218 1,573 2,218 2,218 1,573
R2 0.002 0.003 0.097 0.005 0.010 0.063 0.000 0.001 0.005
Note: Table 4 presents OLS regression estimates for the effects of access to Head Start on the labor force outcomes listed in the top row. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is mothers in the HSIS sample by year. I cluster point estimates by mother's participant ID in each regression. Each observation 
is measured as a binary {0,1} outcome, and the treatment-year effect represents the change in average outcome participation for mothers in the treatment group during 
year t.  *** p < 0.01; ** p <  0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table 4- Annual Effects of Head Start Access on Labor Force Outcomes
HSIS Three-Year-Old Cohort
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
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Figure 2- Labor Outcomes, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation Full Time Employment Part Time Employment 
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subgroup Mean Pre-Treatment 0.525 0.262 0.174 0.726 0.448 0.151 0.503 0.284 0.173 0.663 0.376 0.164
Mean Real Income Pre-Treatment $1,745 $1,398 $1,653 $1,317
Treatment-Year 1 -0.0475 -0.108** 0.0524 0.00925 0.128** -0.0370 0.0188 -0.0296 -0.0117 0.00784 -0.00804 -0.0240
(0.0583) (0.0508) (0.0486) (0.0531) (0.0526) (0.0452) (0.0525) (0.0473) (0.0469) (0.0512) (0.0477) (0.0449)
Treatment- Year 2 -0.0548 -0.0762 0.0763 -0.0330 0.0317 -0.0762 0.0879 0.0500 0.00235 -0.0188 0.000271 -0.0564
(0.0629) (0.0628) (0.0556) (0.0624) (0.0631) (0.0523) (0.0601) (0.0578) (0.0518) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0508)
Treatment- Year 3 -0.0606 -0.0656 0.0132 0.0196 0.0151 0.0124 0.0491 0.0520 -0.00843 0.0154 0.0151 -0.0398
(0.0663) (0.0623) (0.0546) (0.0603) (0.0673) (0.0529) (0.0632) (0.0644) (0.0540) (0.0590) (0.0614) (0.0519)
Treatment- Year 4 -0.0674 -0.000686 -0.0205 -0.0244 0.0390 -0.0683 0.113* -0.0181 0.0879 -0.0188 0.0491 -0.0964*
(0.0674) (0.0670) (0.0611) (0.0591) (0.0671) (0.0553) (0.0630) (0.0646) (0.0541) (0.0591) (0.0626) (0.0545)
n-observations 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 6,829 7,012 7,012 7,012
n-mothers 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339 1339
R2 0.085 0.057 0.006 0.097 0.062 0.007 0.076 0.046 0.007 0.097 0.063 0.007
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10) (11) (12) (7) (8) (9)
Subgroup Mean Pre-Treatment 1 0.570 0.282 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Mean Real Income Pre-Treatment $1,691 $1,920 $1,578 $1,423
Treatment-Year 1 0.0457 0.0235 0.0430 0.0360 -0.0295 0.0766* -0.0925 -0.0368 -0.0531 -0.0457 -0.0235 -0.0191
(0.0490) (0.0402) (0.0396) (0.0460) (0.0495) (0.0408) (0.0575) (0.0654) (0.0701) (0.0490) (0.0402) (0.0290)
Treatment- Year 2 0.0286 -0.0126 0.0530 -0.0753 -0.133** 0.0575 0.0147 0.109 0.0588 -0.0286 0.0126 -0.0215
(0.0554) (0.0511) (0.0454) (0.0520) (0.0554) (0.0454) (0.0674) (0.0728) (0.0686) (0.0554) (0.0511) (0.0359)
Treatment- Year 3 0.0223 -0.0266 -0.0400 0.0183 3.83e-05 0.00846 -0.0128 -0.126 0.0432 -0.0223 0.0266 0.0106
(0.0575) (0.0562) (0.0458) (0.0520) (0.0573) (0.0466) (0.0662) (0.0771) (0.0685) (0.0575) (0.0562) (0.0382)
Treatment- Year 4 -0.103* -0.00289 -0.0792* -0.166*** -0.0819 -0.0570 0.0107 0.00831 0.0133 0.103* 0.00289 0.0199
(0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0479) (0.0520) (0.0578) (0.0488) (0.0689) (0.0785) (0.0680) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0411)
n-observations 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738 6,738
n-mothers 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294
R2 0.226 0.380 0.041 0.349 0.173 0.035 0.146 0.084 0.282 0.349 0.173 0.041
Note: Table 5 presents OLS regression estimates for treatment-subgroup interactions. Pre-treatment mean observations are collected from the 2002 HSIS survey. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is mothers in the HSIS sample by year. I cluster point estimates by mother's participant ID in each regression. Each observation is measured as a binary {0,1} outcome, 
and the treatment-year effect represents the change in average outcome participation for mothers in the treatment group during year t.  *** p < 0.01; ** p <  0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table 5 - Annual Effects of Head Start Access on Labor Force Outcomes, Heterogeneity
HSIS Three-Year-Old Cohort
PANEL A. DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS
SINGLE
In Labor Force Full Time Not Working
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC
Part Time
PANEL B. PRE-TREATMENT 
LABOR STATUS
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Figure 3A- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
White In Labor Force, 2002 Full Time, 2002 
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Figure 3B- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
White In Labor Force, 2002 Full Time, 2002 
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Figure 3C- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort
Part-Time Employment
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Figure 4A- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
Black Hispanic Single Part Time, 2002 
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Figure 4B- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
Black Hispanic Single Part Time, 2002 
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Figure 4C- Subgroup Effects, 3 Year-Old Cohort
Part-Time Employment
Black	   Hispanic	   Single	   Part	  Time,	  2002	  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Pre-Treatment
Treatment-Year 1 0.0130 0.0350 0.0646** -0.00931 -0.00919 0.0133 0.0119 0.0315 0.0379
(0.0178) (0.0250) (0.0277) (0.0167) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0146) (0.0223) (0.0249)
Treatment- Year 2 0.000371 0.00574 0.0158 0.00467 -0.0169 -0.00206 -0.0237 -0.00481 -0.0229
(0.0189) (0.0291) (0.0324) (0.0181) (0.0286) (0.0313) (0.0148) (0.0254) (0.0281)
Treatment- Year 3 0.0413** 0.0196 0.00476 0.0511*** 0.00725 -0.0138 -0.00175 0.00583 0.00622
(0.0189) (0.0301) (0.0337) (0.0187) (0.0306) (0.0344) (0.0154) (0.0263) (0.0289)
Year Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Covariates N N Y N N Y N N Y
n-observations 5,995 5,995 4582 5,995 5,995 4582 5,995 5,995 4582
n-mothers 1,733 1,733 1,338 1,733 1,733 1,338 1,733 1,733 1,338
R2 0.001 0.002 0.088 0.002 0.002 0.059 0.000 0.001 0.013
0.591 0.337 0.151
Note: Table 6 presents OLS regression estimates for the effects of access to Head Start on the labor force outcomes listed in the top row. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is mothers in the HSIS sample by year. I cluster point estimates by mother's participant ID in each regression. Each 
observation is measured as a binary {0,1} outcome, and the treatment-year effect represents the change in average outcome participation for mothers in the treatment 
group during year t.  *** p < 0.01; ** p <  0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table 6- Annual Effects of Head Start Access on Labor Force Outcomes
HSIS Four-Year-Old Cohort
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
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Figure 5- Labor Outcomes, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation Full Time Employment Part Time Employment 
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subgroup Mean Pre-Treatment 0.556 0.310 0.176 0.746 0.457 0.112 0.486 0.281 0.152 0.669 0.397 0.141
Mean Real Income Pre-Treatment $1,745 $1,398 $1,653 $1,317
Treatment-Year 1 -0.0523 -0.101* -0.0339 0.0595 0.186** -0.0729 -0.0163 -0.00601 0.0734 0.0254 0.0921* -0.0409
(0.0573) (0.0553) (0.0538) (0.0740) (0.0736) (0.0597) (0.0542) (0.0512) (0.0487) (0.0551) (0.0537) (0.0482)
Treatment- Year 2 -0.0521 -0.0696 0.0193 0.0479 0.0658 -0.0223 -0.0105 0.00792 0.0135 0.108* 0.0945 -0.00311
(0.0692) (0.0677) (0.0622) (0.0791) (0.0855) (0.0693) (0.0643) (0.0614) (0.0572) (0.0652) (0.0646) (0.0562)
Treatment- Year 3 -0.0407 -0.142* -0.00342 0.0556 0.120 -0.0254 -0.0640 0.0236 0.0146 0.0259 0.0368 -0.00749
(0.0736) (0.0743) (0.0641) (0.0810) (0.0885) (0.0686) (0.0673) (0.0672) (0.0587) (0.0674) (0.0701) (0.0581)
n-observations 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,665 4,774 4,774 4,774
n-mothers 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338
R2 0.072 0.056 0.011 0.087 0.061 0.013 0.075 0.053 0.011 0.087 0.059 0.012
In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time In Labor Force Full Time Part Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10) (11) (12) (7) (8) (9)
Subgroup Mean Pre-Treatment 1 0.584 0.267 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Mean Real Income Pre-Treatment $1,691 $1,920 $1,749 $1,423
Treatment-Year 1 0.00873 0.0286 0.0612 0.0112 0.0915* -0.0393 0.0220 -0.109 0.156** 0.0387 0.0333 -0.0612
(0.0242) (0.0365) (0.0442) (0.0513) (0.0546) (0.0458) (0.0666) (0.0720) (0.0784) (0.0506) (0.0429) (0.0442)
Treatment- Year 2 -0.0387 -0.0333 0.0136 -0.0629 -0.0387 0.00740 -0.0980 -0.00160 -0.0469 0.0862 0.0866 -0.0136
(0.0506) (0.0429) (0.0524) (0.0588) (0.0621) (0.0531) (0.0798) (0.0842) (0.0776) (0.0596) (0.0535) (0.0524)
Treatment- Year 3 -0.0862 -0.0866 0.0761 -0.0821 -0.0387 -0.0564 0.0447 -0.101 0.0945 0.0203 0.129** -0.0761
(0.0596) (0.0535) (0.0541) (0.0605) (0.0641) (0.0554) (0.0803) (0.0868) (0.0758) (0.0627) (0.0603) (0.0541)
n-observations 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627
n-mothers 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294
R2 0.379 0.192 0.055 0.249 0.450 0.055 0.145 0.084 0.320 0.379 0.192 0.015
BLACK HISPANIC SINGLE
Table 7-  Annual Effects of Head Start Access on Labor Force Outcomes, Heterogeneity
HSIS- Four-Year-Old Cohort
PANEL A. DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS
WHITE
PANEL B. PRE-TREATMENT 
LABOR STATUS
In Labor Force
Note: Table 7 presents OLS regression estimates for treatment-subgroup interactions. Pre-treatment mean observations are collected from the 2002 HSIS survey. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is mothers in the HSIS sample by year. I cluster point estimates by mother's participant ID in each regression. Each observation is measured as a binary {0,1} 
outcome, and the treatment-year effect represents the change in average outcome participation for mothers in the treatment group during year t.  *** p < 0.01; ** p <  0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Figure 6A- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
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Figure 6B- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
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Figure 6C- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort
Part-Time Employment
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Figure 7A- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
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Figure 7B- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
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Figure 7C- Subgroup Effects, 4 Year-Old Cohort
Part-Time Employment
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Figure 8A- Robustness Check, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
Full sample No Attrition 
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Figure 8B- Robustness Check, 3 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
Full sample No Attrition 
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Figure 7C- Robustness Check, 3 Year-Old Cohort
Part-Time Employment
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Figure 8D- Robustness Check, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Labor Force Participation 
Full sample No Attrition 
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Figure 8E- Robustness Check, 4 Year-Old Cohort 
Full Time Employment 
Full sample No Attrition 
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Figure 7C- Robustness Check, 4 Year-Old Cohort
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VI. Discussion 
For both the three-year-old and four-year-old cohorts, I find suggestive evidence of 
positive labor-force outcomes resulting from Head Start during the first year of access. These 
estimates align with predictions of the standard labor-leisure model. Mothers who can enroll 
their children in Head Start face a higher effective wage than when they must pay for child care. 
These mothers work for a greater take home wage, pulling mothers who were previously not 
working into the work force and, to a certain extent, creating an incentive for mothers already in 
the labor force to increase their labor-force participation. The statistically significant increases in 
full-time employment among mothers in the three-year-old cohort and labor-force participation 
among mothers in the four-year-old cohort with access to Head Start are strong evidence of these 
positive effects.  
By the time a child enters kindergarten, the effects begin to dissipate in both cohorts. 
Thus, the budget constraints of mothers who are not assigned access to Head Start resemble 
those of mothers in the treatment group after first year of observation. For both cohorts, 
treatment effects across outcomes in the kindergarten year are small and not statistically different 
from a null effect. In my theoretical model, I propose that any changes in labor-force outcomes 
following the treatment year result from returns to labor-force experience in the treatment year. 
The null treatment effects on labor-force participation in the kindergarten year suggest that the 
returns to experience are small or insignificant for Head Start mothers.  
In the year 4 observations of the three-year-old cohort, I find a resurgence of positive 
treatment effects on labor-force participation driven by a shift from mothers not working pre-
HSIS. These effects are different from those in the four-year-old cohort. I propose three 
explanations of this trend. First, the increase in full-time labor-force participation could be the 
result of an extra year of access to the professional development services provided by Head Start, 
which helps parents identify and achieve their economic goals. Mothers in the four-year-old 
cohort only have one year of access to these services, which may be insufficient to yield the 
long-term treatment effects apparent in the three-year-old cohort. Alternatively, differences in 
long-term treatment outcomes between the three- and four-year-old cohorts may be a result of 
the length of observation. With further data, treatment effects may re-emerge with the same lag 
as in the three-year-old cohort. Finally, with respect to the theoretical model, it may be the case 
that low-income and low-educated mothers experience delayed returns to tenure.  
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The theoretical model suggests that mothers should have an immediate response when 
given access to Head Start. It may not always be possible for mothers to have such an elastic 
response, in practice. A mother’s ability to enter the workforce depends on the aggregate labor 
demand and her employment qualifications. Therefore, a mother’s transition into the labor force 
may be a protracted process of training (which is not counted as labor-force participation) and 
job searching. Year 1 observations, on average, occurred 6 months after the initial observation. 
Thus, some lag in effects may be explained by the dynamics of labor-force participation not 
considered in the theoretical model.  
The effects of Head Start treatment were heterogeneous across subgroups. For some 
groups of mothers, including black mothers and mothers not working before Head Start 
treatment, access to Head Start resulted in large increases in labor-force participation 
(particularly full-time employment for black mothers and part-time employment for mothers not 
working pre-treatment). For white mothers, access to Head Start actually decreased the 
likelihood of labor-force participation, pulling mothers who worked full-time before treatment 
out of the labor force altogether. These subgroup effects are similar across both cohorts. When I 
split the subgroups along the mean wage and education levels, the outcomes appear somewhat 
more homogeneous. White mothers and mothers working before treatment had higher household 
income levels and were more likely than the HSIS average to be high school graduates. 
Meanwhile black mothers, single mothers, and mothers not working in the baseline year were, on 
average, less educated and less wealthy than the average mother in the HSIS sample. 
These heterogeneous effects are also consistent with the theoretical model. The model 
suggests that income effects dominate for mothers closest to the Head Start eligibility threshold 
because additional income would make them ineligible for a Head Start subsidy. Labor-force 
outcomes for white mothers, the wealthiest subgroup and the subgroup with a household income 
closest to the eligibility cutoff, support this prediction at statistically significant levels in both 
cohorts. For mothers in the labor force furthest from the eligibility threshold, the model is unable 
to predict the direction of a treatment effect. For black mothers, access to Head Start led to 
increases in labor-force participation. For single mothers and Hispanic mothers, the effects were 
less clear. 
 This study has a few limitations that motivate continued study. As is common in 
experimental studies, HSIS group assignment did not guarantee treatment. Such non-compliant 
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parents are considered “crossovers” and “no-shows” in the study, and account for 5 and 11% of 
the sample, respectively. While I wish to study the causal effect of Head Start participation on 
labor-force outcomes, I only observe causal effects of access to Head Start. Thus, my intention-
to-treat estimates of the effects of Head Start may underestimate the effects on those who use 
Head Start services (Gupta 2011). 
Another drawback of the HSIS methodology, parent surveys relied entirely on self-
reported data, which may be inaccurate. Although it is not clear that the inaccuracies were 
systematic, misreporting may limit the precision of my analysis. I found this to be an issue when 
analyzing self-reported education level. Education level is a nondecreasing economic outcome. 
However, I find that nearly 15% of mothers report a lower educational attainment in Year 1 
survey than in the pre-treatment survey. This effect did not vary across treatment groups. To 
address this issue, specifically, I compare estimates with and without a high school graduate 
covariate and find little effect on point estimates. 
Attrition in the HSIS sample also limits my analysis. High attrition in both the treatment 
and control group (nonresponse rates averaged 20% in each survey year) restrict the observations 
I can use in my analysis and attenuate the precision of my estimates. Because background 
demographic data was collected only in the pre-treatment year, inclusion of race, age, and teen 
mom covariates in my analysis excludes mothers who did not complete the survey in the 2002. 
This automatically restricts my sample to about 80% of the full HSIS sample and may bias my 
estimates. Attrition rates among control mothers, particularly in the four-year-old cohort, exceed 
those of mothers in the treatment group. To offset any bias and error from the restricted sample, I 
include a large and robust set of covariates to capture variance in my estimates. However, 
attrition is a significant limitation of my analysis. 
 Finally, I am limited in the degree to which I can observe changes in labor-force 
outcomes. While the HSIS collects labor-force participation data from mothers and fathers in 
each survey, it only observes the level of participation (full-time, part-time, looking for work, 
e.g.). Thus, I am limited to analyzing large jumps in labor-force participation. I am unable to 
detect, for example, small increases in hours worked unless such an increase transitions a mother 
from part- to full-time labor. This may explain the relatively weak fit of my data in explaining 
treatment effects on part-time employment. Full-time employment and mothers out of the labor 
force are somewhat more homogeneous, while there are varying degrees of part-time 
 Light 37 
employment. The relative variance in part-time employment as an outcome measure is not 
captured in a discrete measure. Thus, I find part-time employment to be the noisiest outcome in 
my analysis. 
VII. Conclusion 
 This paper provides the first analysis of the effects of access to Head Start on the parents 
of participants. In the context of a broad literature observing student-level impacts and ongoing 
policy debate regarding the efficacy of the program, my analysis considers a different segment of 
Head Start stakeholders. In my analysis, I find suggestive evidence of positive labor-force 
outcomes resulting from access to Head Start. With access to Head Start, mothers in the three-
year-old cohort of the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS) sample were 4.81% more likely to work 
full-time, while mothers in the four-year-old cohort were 6.46% more likely to be in the labor 
force. These effects were heterogeneous with respect to relative economic advantage. Subgroups 
of mothers with the greatest average pre-Head Start income, particularly white mothers, were 
more likely to decrease the degree of labor-force participation when they had access to Head 
Start. Conversely, the least advantaged subgroups of mothers in the sample with access to Head 
Start (black mothers, in particular) were more likely to substituted their time into employment. I 
find that first year treatment outcomes are consistent in sign for first time applicants in both the 
three- and four-year-old cohorts of the HSIS sample. When participants enter kindergarten (and 
all mothers in the sample have access to public education services), the positive labor-force 
outcomes fade slightly in the full sample. 
 My analysis fits in and adds to the broader policy analysis of the Head Start program. I 
find that the average mother in the HSIS sample substitutes some of the time otherwise allocated 
towards non-labor activities into the labor force when during the first year she has access to Head 
Start. Increased participation in the labor force generates private benefits through income and 
skill accumulation, and could contribute to economic stability in the long run. An increase in 
labor-force participation can have positive public benefits, in the form of greater tax revenue and 
a decreased reliance on social programs, and social externalities (Rolnick and Grunewald 2003). 
Such benefits might suggest that Head Start is not large enough to maximize the social benefit of 
the program. However, the effects of Head Start on labor-force outcomes are heterogeneous 
among subgroups. In light of the effects on more advantaged subgroups in my sample, my 
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findings might recommend revision of the program design to better incentivize labor-force 
participation, similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
In this paper, I consider exclusively the effect of access to Head Start on mothers’ labor-
force participation. Mothers who leave the labor force when they receive access to Head Start, 
however, are not necessarily unproductive. They may return to school, enroll in a job-training 
program, or leave to take care of younger children. Further study of the effects of access to Head 
Start on a broader set of economic outcomes will complement the findings of this study. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Definitions 
Labor-force outcomes- labor force is observed in each survey through the variable 
P1WORKMO, which captures the following responses: (1) working full-time (35 hours or more 
per week), (2) working part-time, (3) looking for work, (4) laid off from work, (5) in 
school/training, (6) in jail/prison, (7) in military, (8) keeping house, (9) something else. I define 
the variables in Table A2 using this data. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  
Year Available Variable Code Variable Type Description
Hispanic 2002 P1MHISP Binary
White 2002 P1MWH Binary
Black 2002 P1MBL Binary This question was skipped for parents who reported race as white. Thus, I fill in {0} if P1MWH = 1.
Married All P1MARMO Binary
Single/Not Married All P1MARMO Binary All outcomes besides married (separated, divorced, widowed, never married)
High School Graduate All P1GRMO Binary Education level is observed as a discrete categorization. I define high school graduate as mothers 
who report at least high school completion
Teen Mom 2002 P1BIRTH Binary Reported as age when first gave birth. I define Teen Mom = 1 when P1BIRTH < 20.
Age 2002 P1MBYR Integer Reported as birth year. I subtract from survey year (2002) to calculate age in years.
Number of Children All P1REL[n] Integer Parents reported the relatinoship of each member of the household. I count the number of children as 
the sum of each brother, stepbrother, sister, or stepsister reported, plus the participant child.
Child ID All HSIS_CHILDID Integer
Treatment Group All CHILDRESULTGROUP Binary {0 = CONTROL, 1 = TREATMENT}
Cohort All CHILDCOHORT Binary
Crossover All CROSSOVER Binary
No Show All NOSHOW Binary
Year All Imputed Integer Each observation is coded with a year variable representing years since baseline survey in 2002. 
Table A3- Characteristic Variable Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mother In Labor Force x x x x x
Mother Working Full Time x x
Mother Working Part-Time x
Mother Not Working x x x x x x
Table A2 - Labor Force Variable Definitions
Fall 2002 Spring 2003 Spring 2004 Spring 2005 Spring 2006
3 Year-Old Cohort HS (Baseline) HS HS Kdg 1st
4 Year-Old Cohort HS (Baseline) HS Kdg 1st n/a
Notation Baseline Year Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Table A1- HSIS Survey Timeline
